Further reading

A categorised, annotated reading list for the course

← Back to the course

Every work below links to its published version (or, where there is none, a stable working-paper page) in the full reference list at the foot of the page — click any author–year citation to jump to it. The one-liner says what each paper is for in this course.

TipIf you only read a handful
  • The debate, end to end — Drezner (2024), Felbermayr et al. (2025),
  • Firm level — Crozet and Hinz (2020), Crozet et al. (2021), Scheckenhofer et al. (2025).
  • Macro — Caliendo and Parro (2015), Itskhoki and Ribakova (2024), Hausmann et al. (2024).

Surveys & where to start

  • Drezner (2024) — the cleanest IR-theory frame for the modern debate.
  • Felbermayr et al. (2025) — the empirical and methodological synthesis: stylized facts and quantitative evidence.
  • Morgan et al. (2023) — an accessible companion survey: evolution, consequences, challenges.
  • 1 — Trade Sanctions: stylized facts, firm-level evidence and GE numbers in one place.
  • Smeets (2018) — the institutional, WTO-balanced “can sanctions work?” framing.

Foundations, history & concepts

  • Hirschman (1945) — asymmetric interdependence; the conceptual root of every modern model.
  • Farrell and Newman (2019) — weaponized interdependence: networks, chokepoints and panopticons.
  • Schelling (1966) — coercive bargaining: threats vs warfare, deterrence vs compellence.
  • Fearon (1995) — the bargaining-model foundation that makes “sanctions as inside option” legible.
  • Baldwin (1985) — Economic Statecraft, the benchmark text on sanctions as a policy tool.
  • Drezner (1999) — the sanctions paradox: coercion bites harder against allies than adversaries.
  • Drezner (2003) — the “hidden hand”: why threatened sanctions matter more than imposed ones.
  • Galtung (1967) — the Rhodesia case that founded the empirical field.
  • Hufbauer et al. (2009) — Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (3rd ed.); the HSE database and the original “do sanctions work?” question.
  • Hufbauer et al. (1990) — the 1990 second edition of HSE; the large-\(N\) benchmark.
  • Mulder (2022) — The Economic Weapon; the interwar history that frames the contemporary parallels.
  • Pape (1997) — “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work”: the pessimist critique.
  • Morgan et al. (2009) — the TIES dataset; the empirical answer to the threat-stage selection problem.
  • Portela and Mora-Sanguinetti (2023) — regime-type heterogeneity: when (and against whom) sanctions actually move policy.
  • Doxey (1971) — the early European comparative-politics tradition on sanctions enforcement.
  • Doxey (1980) — the expanded, post-Rhodesia second edition.

Quantitative trade models & methods

  • Caliendo and Parro (2015) — the multi-sector, input–output-linkage NQTM workhorse; the hat-algebra KITE solves.
  • Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) — the Handbook chapter mapping every gravity model back to four primitives.
  • Head and Mayer (2014) — the Handbook practitioner’s guide: gravity as workhorse, toolkit and cookbook.
  • Eaton and Kortum (2002) — the Ricardian sectoral primitive underneath Caliendo–Parro.
  • Arkolakis et al. (2012) — “new trade models, same old gains?”; the ACR gains-from-trade ceiling.
  • Allen et al. (2020) — universal gravity and the uniqueness of the equilibrium fixed point.
  • Antràs and Gortari (2020) — global value chains and the geography of intermediate-input trade.
  • Yotov (2024) — a short refresher on the evolution of structural gravity.
  • Caliendo et al. (2019) — dynamic Caliendo–Parro: labour-market dynamics in general equilibrium.
  • Caliendo and Parro (2022) — the modern Handbook survey of quantitative trade-policy analysis.
  • Adão et al. (2023) — heterogeneous-agent NQTM: the within-country distribution of welfare effects.
  • Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) — “The Log of Gravity”: why we estimate with PPML.
  • Eaton et al. (2011) — “An Anatomy of International Trade”: the micro-anchor for the gravity-firm decomposition.
  • Nagengast and Yotov (2025) — staggered difference-in-differences in gravity settings.
  • Heid et al. (2021) — identifying non-discriminatory trade policies inside structural gravity.
  • Heid and Stähler (2024) — structural gravity and gains from trade under imperfect competition.
  • Apfel et al. (2025) — out-of-sample gravity predictions and trade-policy counterfactuals.
  • Larch et al. (2024) — sectoral structural gravity applied to agricultural sanctions.
  • Larch et al. (2022) — energy- and mining-sector gravity; mirrors the KITE energy-shock setup.

Macro & general-equilibrium counterfactuals

  • Chowdhry et al. (2024) — Brothers in Arms: the value of coalitions in sanctions regimes; the model KITE is built on.
  • Itskhoki and Ribakova (2024) — the cleanest big-picture synthesis from theory to Russia-2022 practice.
  • Hausmann et al. (2024) — sanction effectiveness is convex in coalition market share; the HS6-level design lesson.
  • Felbermayr et al. (2023) — China decoupling as a structurally identical KITE exercise.
  • Ghironi et al. (2024) — third-country general-equilibrium spillovers in a calibrated macro model.
  • Ghironi et al. (2025) — dynamic NQTM with sectoral asymmetries and transitional dynamics.
  • Baqaee and Malmberg (2025) — long-run capital misallocation and lost technology access (Russia, 10-year horizon).
  • Bianchi and Sosa-Padilla (2024) — wars, sanctions and sovereign default; reserve loss and fiscal stress.
  • Borin et al. (2023) — an early-war input–output counterfactual of trade decoupling from Russia.
  • Bachmann et al. (2024) — the Germany energy-stop counterfactual: substitution elasticities and adjustment frictions.
  • Mayer et al. (2026) — can sanctions deter wars? Pre-war decoupling lowers exposure but also the opportunity cost of conflict.

Oil price cap & energy

  • Johnson et al. (2023) — the design and implementation of the Russian oil price cap.
  • Spiro et al. (2025) — assessing oil sanctions on Russia: revenue effects, the shadow fleet, discounted crude.
  • Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2025) — the (un)intended consequences of oil sanctions; “dark shipping” as evasion technology.

Firm-level evidence — sanctioning (“sender”) side

  • Crozet and Hinz (2020) — Friendly Fire: the intensive-margin gravity counterfactual on 2014 Russia; most lost trade is in non-embargoed goods.
  • Crozet et al. (2021) — the extensive-margin, bias-corrected three-way fixed-effects probit: the firms that exit do not return.
  • Görg et al. (2024) — Germany 2022: heterogeneity by firm size and exposure.
  • Hart et al. (2024) — “private sanctions”: voluntary corporate exits running in parallel with state action.
  • Biermann and Leromain (2025) — a stock-market event study around February 2022: trade linkages and the market response.
  • Berthou and Stumpner (2024) — credit shocks and trade; the trade-finance channel behind the Friendly Fire result.
  • Li et al. (2024) — neutral-country (Chinese) firms and the post-2022 rerouting of sanctioned products.
  • Bergin and Lin (2012) — Bergin–Lin on currency unions and trade margins; the methodological cousin of the extensive-margin result.

Firm-level evidence — target side

  • Aytun et al. (2025) — Turkey’s 2015–16 Russian embargo: intensive + extensive margin, employment and customer networks.
  • Nigmatulina (2022) — sanctions and misallocation: targeted firms gain via state shielding.
  • Ahn and Ludema (2020) — Russia 2014, the target side: “the sword and the shield.”
  • Miromanova (2023) — Russia 2014: a firm-level extensive/intensive decomposition with unit values.
  • Haidar (2017) — Iranian exporters deflect sanctioned trade to non-sanctioning markets, at a discount.
  • Moghaddasi Kelishomi and Nisticò (2022) — Iran: imported-input dependence transmits the shock to formal manufacturing employment.
  • Moghaddasi Kelishomi and Nisticò (2024) — the Iran follow-up: reallocation from formal to informal employment.
  • Lastauskas et al. (2023) — supplier and customer reorganization after sudden trade stops.
  • Gavoille (2025) — the Baltic post-2022 collapse versus its partial recovery.

Circumvention & enforcement

  • Scheckenhofer et al. (2025) — military goods are +20 pp more likely to reach Russia via friendly hubs after Feb 2022.
  • Chupilkin et al. (2026) — the Eurasian roundabout: rerouting through the Caucasus and Central Asia.
  • Fisman et al. (2025) — “the undoing of economic sanctions”: conflict-zone trade and illicit rechanneling.
  • Avdeenko et al. (2026) — online intermediaries sustaining sanctioned-country commercial presence on platforms.
  • Langenmayr et al. (2025) — offshore, tax-haven and shell-structure bypass channels.
  • Ito and Tanaka (2026) — “oil laundering”: crude-to-refined-product laundering through third countries.
  • Hilgenstock et al. (2025) — export-control enforcement reframed as a financial-monitoring problem.
  • Janeba (2024) — a theory of secondary / extraterritorial sanctions.
  • Kwon et al. (2024) — identifying and quantifying extraterritorial effects inside structural gravity.

The financial channel

  • Drott et al. (2024) — TARGET2 microdata on Russian banks: SWIFT exclusion at the payment-flow level.
  • Besedeš et al. (2024) — “smart or smash?”: distinguishing financial from trade sanctions.
  • Berthou (2023) — sanctions, dollar dominance and the currency of trade invoicing.
  • Mamonov et al. (2023) — banks anticipating and propagating financial sanctions.
  • Bayer et al. (2024) — how financial and trade sanctions reinforce one another.

Policy & institutional analysis

  • Schott (2023) — PIIE: how effective and how durable are the sanctions on Russia?
  • Simola (2023) — BOFIT’s literature review on the economic effects of sanctioning Russia.
  • Astrov et al. (2024) — the wiiw Russia Monitor on maritime adjustment and trade redirection.

Data, trackers & tools

Sanctions & trade data

  • Yalcin et al. (2025) — the Global Sanctions Data Base, Release 4: heterogeneous effects on Russia. Portal.
  • OECD (2021) — the OECD ICIO tables (2022 reference year): KITE’s initial conditions. Landing page.
  • Larch et al. (2025) — ITPD-E Release 3: sector-level bilateral trade for QTM counterfactuals.
  • BACI (CEPII) — bilateral trade at HS6.
  • DIAN exports via datos.gov.co — the Exercise 1 source.

Live trackers

Software

References

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Allen, Treb, Costas Arkolakis, and Yuta Takahashi. 2020. “Universal Gravity.” Journal of Political Economy 128 (2): 393–433. https://doi.org/10.1086/704385.
Antràs, Pol, and Alonso de Gortari. 2020. “On the Geography of Global Value Chains.” Econometrica 88 (4): 1553–98. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA15362.
Apfel, Nicolas, Holger Breinlich, Nathaniel Green, Dennis Novy, J. M. C. Santos Silva, and Thomas Zylkin. 2025. Out-of-Sample Gravity Predictions and Trade Policy Counterfactuals. 2509.11271. arXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.11271.
Arkolakis, Costas, Arnaud Costinot, and Andrés Rodríguez-Clare. 2012. “New Trade Models, Same Old Gains?” American Economic Review 102 (1): 94–130. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.1.94.
Astrov, Vasily, Christopher Brockhaus, Julian Hinz, Lukas Jessen-Thiesen, Hendrik Mahlkow, and Patrik Šváb. 2024. Navigating Trade Restrictions: Russia Monitor 3. The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw). https://wiiw.ac.at/navigating-trade-restrictions-p-6810.html.
Avdeenko, Alexandra, Maximilian Kaiser, Krisztina Kis-Katos, and Leonie Reher. 2026. “Sanctions, Sales, and Stigma: Intermediary Online Firms’ Market Role in Sustaining Trade.” Journal of International Economics 159: 104197. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2025.104197.
Aytun, Ugur, Julian Hinz, and Cem Özgüzel. 2025. “Shooting down Trade: Firm-Level Effects of Embargoes.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 231: 106821. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106821.
Bachmann, Rüdiger, David Baqaee, Christian Bayer, et al. 2024. “What If? The Macroeconomic and Distributional Effects for Germany of a Stop of Energy Imports from Russia.” Economica 91 (364): 1157–200. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12546.
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Baqaee, David, and Hannes Malmberg. 2025. “Long-Run Consequences of Sanctions on Russia.” AEA Papers and Proceedings 115: 583–87. https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20251087.
Bayer, Christian, Alexander Gilch, and Farzad Saidi. 2024. Financial Sanctions Interact(ed) with Trade Sanctions. University of Bonn. http://www.farzadsaidi.com/papers/BGS_sanctions.pdf.
Bergin, Paul R., and Ching-Yi Lin. 2012. “The Dynamic Effects of a Currency Union on Trade.” Journal of International Economics 87 (2): 191–204. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2012.01.005.
Berthou, Antoine. 2023. International Sanctions and the Dollar: Evidence from Trade Invoicing. Working Paper 924. Banque de France. https://ideas.repec.org/p/bfr/banfra/924.html.
Berthou, Antoine, and Sebastian Stumpner. 2024. “Trade Under Lockdown.” Journal of International Economics 152: 104013. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2024.104013.
Besedeš, Tibor, Stefan Goldbach, and Volker Nitsch. 2024. “Smart or Smash? The Effect of Financial Sanctions on Trade in Goods and Services.” Review of International Economics 32 (1): 223–51. https://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12706.
Bianchi, Javier, and Cesar Sosa-Padilla. 2024. “On Wars, Sanctions, and Sovereign Default.” Journal of Monetary Economics 141: 62–70. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2023.10.011.
Biermann, Marcus, and Elsa Leromain. 2025. “The Ripple Effect: Trade Linkages and the Stock Market Response to the Russia–Ukraine War.” Review of World Economics 161 (4): 1637–60. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-025-00594-4.
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Caliendo, Lorenzo, and Fernando Parro. 2015. “Estimates of the Trade and Welfare Effects of NAFTA.” Review of Economic Studies 82 (1): 1–44. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdu035.
Caliendo, Lorenzo, and Fernando Parro. 2022. “Trade Policy.” In Handbook of International Economics, edited by Gita Gopinath, Elhanan Helpman, and Kenneth Rogoff, vol. 5. Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hesint.2022.02.004.
Chowdhry, Sonali, Julian Hinz, Katrin Kamin, and Joschka Wanner. 2024. “Brothers in Arms: The Value of Coalitions in Sanctions Regimes.” Economic Policy 39 (118): 471–512. https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiae019.
Chupilkin, Maxim, Beata Javorcik, and Alexander Plekhanov. 2026. “The Eurasian Roundabout: Trade Flows into Russia Through the Caucasus and Central Asia.” European Economic Review 187: 105340. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2026.105340.
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Crozet, Matthieu, and Julian Hinz. 2020. “Friendly Fire: The Trade Impact of the Russia Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions.” Economic Policy 35 (101): 97–146. https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiaa006.
Crozet, Matthieu, Julian Hinz, Amrei Stammann, and Joschka Wanner. 2021. “Worth the Pain? Firms’ Exporting Behaviour to Countries Under Sanctions.” European Economic Review 134: 103683. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103683.
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Drezner, Daniel W. 2024. “Global Economic Sanctions.” Annual Review of Political Science 27: 9–24. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041322-032240.
Drott, Constantin, Stefan Goldbach, and Volker Nitsch. 2024. “The Effects of Sanctions on Russian Banks in TARGET2 Transactions Data.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 219: 38–51. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.12.030.
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Felbermayr, Gabriel, Hendrik Mahlkow, and Alexander-Nikolai Sandkamp. 2023. “Cutting Through the Value Chain: The Long-Run Effects of Decoupling the East from the West.” Empirica 50 (1): 75–108. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10663-022-09561-w.
Felbermayr, Gabriel, T. Clifton Morgan, Constantinos Syropoulos, and Yoto V. Yotov. 2025. “Economic Sanctions: Stylized Facts and Quantitative Evidence.” Annual Review of Economics 17: 175–95. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-081623-020909.
Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús, Yiliang Li, Le Xu, and Francesco Zanetti. 2025. Charting the Uncharted: The (Un)intended Consequences of Oil Sanctions and Dark Shipping. Working Paper 11684. CESifo. https://www.cesifo.org/en/publications/2025/working-paper/charting-uncharted-unintended-consequences-oil-sanctions-and-dark.
Fisman, Raymond, Giovanna Marcolongo, and Meng Wu. 2025. “The Undoing of Economic Sanctions: Evidence from the Russia–Ukraine Conflict.” Journal of Public Economics 249: 105470. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105470.
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Gavoille, Nicolas. 2025. A Short Drop or a Sudden Stop? Sanctions, Trade Shocks, and Firms’ Adjustment Margins. Working Paper 2025/03. Latvijas Banka. https://ideas.repec.org/p/ltv/wpaper/202503.html.
Ghironi, Fabio, Daisoon Kim, and Galip Kemal Ozhan. 2024. “International Economic Sanctions and Third-Country Effects.” IMF Economic Review 72 (2): 611–52. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41308-023-00232-9.
Ghironi, Fabio, Daisoon Kim, and Galip Kemal Ozhan. 2025. “International Trade and Macroeconomic Dynamics with Sanctions.” Journal of Monetary Economics 154: 103810. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2025.103810.
Görg, Holger, Anna Jacobs, and Saskia Meuchelböck. 2024. “Who Is to Suffer? Quantifying the Impact of Sanctions on German Firms.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 228: 106767. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106767.
Haidar, Jamal Ibrahim. 2017. “Sanctions and Export Deflection: Evidence from Iran.” Economic Policy 32 (90): 319–55. https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eix002.
Hart, Oliver D., David Thesmar, and Luigi Zingales. 2024. “Private Sanctions.” Economic Policy 39 (117): 203–68. https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiad041.
Hausmann, Ricardo, Ulrich Schetter, and Muhammed A. Yildirim. 2024. “On the Design of Effective Sanctions: The Case of Bans on Exports to Russia.” Economic Policy 39 (117): 109–53. https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiad043.
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Ito, Tadashi, and Kiyoyasu Tanaka. 2026. Oil Laundering: How Did Russian Oil Circumvent the European Union’s Embargo? Discussion Paper 26-E-024. RIETI. https://www.rieti.go.jp/en/publications/summary/26030007.html.
Itskhoki, Oleg, and Elina Ribakova. 2024. “The Economics of Sanctions: From Theory into Practice.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 55 (2): 425–97. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-economics-of-sanctions-from-theory-into-practice/.
Janeba, Eckhard. 2024. “Extraterritorial Trade Sanctions: Theory and Application to the US–Iran–EU Conflict.” Review of International Economics 32 (1): 49–71. https://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12682.
Johnson, Simon, Lukasz Rachel, and Catherine Wolfram. 2023. “Design and Implementation of the Price Cap on Russian Oil Exports.” Journal of Comparative Economics 51 (4): 1244–52. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2023.06.001.
Kwon, Ohyun, Constantinos Syropoulos, and Yoto V. Yotov. 2024. “Identifying and Quantifying the Extraterritorial Effects of Sanctions.” European Economic Review 170: 104888. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104888.
Langenmayr, Dominika, Mikayel Tovmasyan, and Sebastian Vosseler. 2025. Bypassing Sanctions: Hide ’n Seek in Tax Havens? Working Paper 12086. CESifo. https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_12086.html.
Larch, Mario, Jeff Luckstead, and Yoto V. Yotov. 2024. “Economic Sanctions and Agricultural Trade.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 106 (4): 1477–517. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajae.12473.
Larch, Mario, Serge Shikher, Constantinos Syropoulos, and Yoto V. Yotov. 2022. “Quantifying the Impact of Economic Sanctions on International Trade in the Energy and Mining Sectors.” Economic Inquiry 60 (3): 1038–63. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.13077.
Larch, Mario, Serge Shikher, and Yoto V. Yotov. 2025. The International Trade and Production Database for Estimation — Release 3 (ITPD-E-R03). Working Paper 2025–06–A. U.S. International Trade Commission, Office of Economics. https://www.usitc.gov/data/gravity/itpde.htm.
Lastauskas, Povilas, Aurėlija Proškutė, and Alminas Žaldokas. 2023. “How Do Firms Adjust When Trade Stops?” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 216: 287–307. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.09.004.
Li, Haishi, Zhi Li, Ziho Park, Yulin Wang, and Jing Wu. 2024. To Comply or Not to Comply: Understanding Neutral Country Supply Chain Responses to Russian Sanctions. Working Paper 11110. CESifo. https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_11110.html.
Mamonov, Mikhail, Anna Pestova, and Steven Ongena. 2023. Crime and Punishment? How Banks Anticipate and Propagate Global Financial Sanctions. Research Paper 23-59. Swiss Finance Institute. https://ideas.repec.org/p/chf/rpseri/rp2359.html.
Mayer, Thierry, Isabelle Méjean, and Mathias Thoenig. 2026. “Can Sanctions Deter Wars? The Russia–Ukraine Case.” AEA Papers and Proceedings 116: 114–18. https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20261071.
Miromanova, Anna. 2023. “Quantifying the Trade-Reducing Effect of Embargoes: Firm-Level Evidence from Russia.” Canadian Journal of Economics 56 (3): 1121–60. https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12667.
Moghaddasi Kelishomi, Ali, and Roberto Nisticò. 2022. “Employment Effects of Economic Sanctions in Iran.” World Development 151: 105760. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105760.
Moghaddasi Kelishomi, Ali, and Roberto Nisticò. 2024. “Economic Sanctions and Informal Employment.” Labour Economics 89: 102581. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2024.102581.
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